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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The jurisdiction is proper before this Court under the
provisions of §78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated, as amended.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Appellant's issue for review is whether there was

reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime was being committed
when the officer initiated the traffic stop of Appellant's
vehicle.
The standard of review relevant to this decision is that
this "is a determination of law and is reviewed for correctness.
No particular deference is accorded the trial court's
determination".

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994).

This issue was properly preserved by the trial Court as is
set forth in Appellant's Response to Sua Sponte Motion for
Summary Disposition, the parties Affidavit and the Affidavit of
the Honorable Alfred C. Van Wagenen filed with this Court.
Appellant relies upon the interpretation of the following as
being determinative of his appeal:

Fourth Amendment to the

United States Constitution; §77-7-15, U.C.A. 1953, as amended;
and §41-6-44.20 U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
1).

(Attached as Addendum
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Further, Appellant asserts that an independent issue exists
relative to the Trial Court's behavior at the Suppression Hearing
concerning inattentiveness and prejudice toward Appellant's case.
The issue is whether Appellant was denied a fair and impartial
hearing by the Court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about January 20, 1996, the State of Utah charged
Appellant with the crime of Operating or Being in Actual Physical
Control of a Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol
pursuant to Section 41-6-44, U.C.A. 1953, as amended.

Record pp.

4-6.
On or about September 19, 1996, Appellant moved to have the
evidence suppressed and the charge dismissed by the Trial Court
on the basis that the stop of Appellant's vehicle was not based
on reasonable suspicion that Appellant had committed or was about
to commit a crime as required under Utah law.

Record pp. 13-14.

On or about December 6, 1996, Appellant's Motion to Suppress
and Dismiss was heard and denied by the Honorable Alfred C. Van
Wagenen.

Record pp. 15, 29-70.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On or about January 20, 1996, Appellant was travelling
southbound on Main Street approaching the intersection of 2000
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North in Sunset, Utah.

Officer Bruce Arbogast, of the Sunset

Police Department was stopped northbound in the left turn lane on
Main Street at the intersection of 2000 North in Sunset, Utah.
Formal Information, Record pp. 4-6; Transcript of Suppression
Hearing, Record p. 4.
At the time of this incident, Officer Arbogast had only been
an officer for approximately six months.

Transcript of

Suppression Hearing, Record p. 10.
Officer Arbogast testified that he made his stop solely
based on his observation that Appellant was drinking from a dark
brown bottle.

Transcript of Suppression Hearing, Record p. 44.

Officer Arbogast testified that had an occupant of
Appellant's vehicle, such as a child been drinking from a brown
bottle, he would not have suspected that it was a beer.
Transcript of Suppression Hearing, Record

p. 58.

Officer Arbogast testified that he observed Appellant
drinking a dark colored bottle with a wrapper on it and that made
him believe that it was an alcoholic beverage.

Transcript of

Suppression Hearing, Record p. 34.
When Officer Arbogast was asked whether he was able to tell
what kind of label was on the bottle, he testified that he could
see some colors, but at the time, he could only probably guess,
he wasnft exactly sure what it was.
Hearing, Record p. 40.

Transcript of Suppression
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When asked to describe the side of the bottle, Officer
Arbogast testified that it was "a standard bottle size for
alcohol".

Transcript of Suppression Hearing, Record p. 34-35.

Officer Arbogast testified that he is not a drinker
(referring to alcohol), but that he was guessing that a standard
size bottle for "alcohol" is probably seven to eight inches tall,
but isn't sure.

Officer Arbogast could not answer how many

ounces would be in a bottle of that size, but guessed it would be
anywhere from up to twelve ounces.

Transcript of Suppression

Hearing, Record p. 41-42.
In spite of testimony relating to an unfamiliarity with soda
and beer bottles, Officer Arbogast testified that most of the
soda pop bottles, root beer or ice tea bottles are the same size
as the beer bottle recovered in this case.

Transcript of

Suppression Hearing, Record p. 43-44.
Officer Arbogast testified that he had investigated
approximately 10 cases at the time of the suppression hearing
involving recovery of brown bottles, which were beer bottles.
This 10 case experience came after he had been an officer for
approximately 18 months.

He had only been an officer for

approximately 6 months at the time of this stop and had
significantly less experience.
Hearing, Record pp. 7, 67.

Transcript of Suppression
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Officer Arbogast estimated Appellant was travelling
approximately 7 miles per hour at the time of the observation.
Transcript of Suppression Hearing, Record p. 40,
Officer Arbogast testified his observation was made through
Appellant's driver's side window as Appellant was passing him on
the roadway.

Transcript of Suppression Hearing, Record pp. 50#

53.
Officer Arbogast testified Appellant's truck had a camper on
it and side mirrors mounted on the doors. Officer Arbogast's
observation was made after had passed the patrol vehicle far
enough so that the side mirrors were not blocking the officer's
view into the driver's side window.

Transcript of Suppression

Hearing, Record pp. 50-51.
Officer Arbogast testified that Appellant's driver's side
window was approximately two to two and a half feet wide.
Transcript of Suppression Hearing, Record p. 51.
Officer Arbogast testified that it would take a vehicle
travelling seven to ten miles per hour probably under a second or
two to travel five feet.

Officer Arbogast testified his

observation of Appellant through the driver's side window lasted
more than one second.

Transcript of Suppression Hearing, Record

p. 52.
Officer Arbogast testified that he had suspicions that
Appellant was drinking a Budweiser beer, but couldn't tell that
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that was exactly what it was.

Officer Arbogast believed that he

saw Appellant drinking an "alcoholic beverage".

Transcript of

Suppression Hearing, Record p. 54.
Officer Arbogast testified that the thought of whether the
bottle could have possibly been a root beer bottle did not enter
his mind at the point from when he initiated the stop.

He

testified that he had it in his mind that it was an "alcoholic
beverage".

Transcript of Suppression Hearing, Record pp. 54-55.

Officer Arbogast testified that he did not include an
indication in his report identifying the bottle as brown.
Officer Arbogast testified that he did not include an indication
in his report that the bottle had a red and white label.

Officer

Arbogast testified to these details approximately 11 months after
the arrest.

Formal Information, Record p 4-6; Transcript of

Suppression Hearing, Record pp. 1,44,53.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.
WHETHER THERE WAS REASONABLE SUSPICION TO BELIEVE
THAT A CRIME WAS BEING COMMITTED WHEN THE OFFICER
INITIATED THE TRAFFIC STOP OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE.
Appellant contends that Officer Arbogast did not have
reasonable suspicion that Appellant was engaged in illegal
conduct.

Officer Arbogastfs conduct violated Appellant's right

under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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II.
WHETHER APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR AND
IMPARTIAL HEARING BY THE COURT.
Appellant contends that the Honorable Alfred C. Van Wagenen
was inattentive at trial, did not allow Appellant's counsel
equitable opportunity to present his case as is shown in the
record.

ARGUMENT
I,
WHETHER THERE WAS REASONABLE SUSPICION TO BELIEVE
THAT A CRIME WAS BEING COMMITTED WHEN THE OFFICER
INITIATED THE TRAFFIC STOP OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE.
It is clear from the testimony at the Suppression Hearing,
that the sole basis for Officer Arbogast*s stop is that he
observed Appellant take a drink from a brown colored bottle when
he glimpsed at Appellant as Appellant was passing the officer's
patrol car at an estimated speed of seven miles per hour, which
would equate to a rate of ten feet per second-

Upon making that

instant observation, Officer Arbogast merely suspicioned that the
unidentified brown bottle was a beer bottle and proceeded to
initiate a stop presumably based upon a violation of the Open
Container law.
"Stopping of a vehicle and consequent detention of
its occupants constitutes a seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment, even if the purpose of the
stop is limited and the resulting detention brief."
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
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The Utah Supreme Court has held:
"An officer may seize a person if the officer has an
"articulable suspicion" that the person has committed
or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention
must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop."" State v.
Steward, 806 P.2d 213 (Utah Ap. 1991) citing State v.
Deitman, 739 p.2D 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam)
(quoting U.S. v. Marritt, 735 F.2d 223, 230 (4th Cir.
1984)).
In determining the existence of reasonable suspicion, a
court must look at the totality of the circumstances.

State v.

Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991)
In the case at hand, it is clear that Officer Arbogast did
not have articulable suspicion that Appellant had committed or
was about to commit a crime based upon the officer's suspicion
that Defendant was consuming alcohol merely because he was
drinking from a brown colored bottle.
In the State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), the
court indicated:
"...the courts are not relieved of their duty to...
decide whether the particular observation bears any
reasonable correlation to a suspicion that the person
presently is engaged in criminal activity." Sery citing
U.S. v, Sokolow. 831 F.2d 1413f 1418 (9th Cir. 1987)
In the U.S. v. Nicholas, 104 F.3d 368, 1996 WL 731605 (10th
Cir. (Utah)), (unpublished disposition attached as Addendum 1),
the officer initiated his stop because he thought the driver of
the vehicle may have been drinking.

He based his suspicion on
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his observation that someone got out of the car with what the
officer thought to be an open container.
"An officer's unparticularized suspicion or hunch
cannot create circumstances giving rise to reasonable
suspicion." Nicholas citing U.S. v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d
874# 878 (10th Cir. 1994)
"[s]ome facts must be outrightly dismissed as so innocent or
susceptible to varying interpretations as to be innocuous."
Nicholas citing U.S. v. Lee, 73 F.3d 1034 (10th Cir. 1996).
In Nicholas it was determined by the Court that the officer
stopped Defendant because he believed he might have been
drinking, which must have meant he stopped Defendant because he
suspected he was driving under the influence of alcohol. As in
the instant case, the officer in Nicholas described no driving
pattern to support an inference that Defendant was driving under
the influence of alcohol.

The court found that the evidence in

that case simply did not support a determination that at the time
of the initial stop, the officer had reasonable particularized
suspicion Defendant had committed or was committing a crime.
In the instant case, the officer had no opportunity to
evaluate Appellant's demeanor, his driving pattern or any other
circumstance upon which to base his stop prior to initiating the
same.

Appellant was stopped solely on the basis that the officer

observed him drinking from a "brown bottle".

His observation was

merely as to the color of the bottle, not even to the type or
size of bottle.

The officer's testimony is clear that he had no
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certainty that the bottle was in fact a bottle containing
alcohol, but suspicioned that it was an "alcoholic beverage" and
proceeded to initiate the stop.

The officer also testified that

he does not drink alcohol, he does not drink soda, teas or other
such beverages and is not familiar with their bottles. He
further indicated that he believed the bottle he observed
Appellant drinking from was a "standard" size bottle for alcohol,
yet the officer is not a consumer of alcoholic or other types of
bottled beverages.

The "standard" size bottle Officer Arbogast

refers to is also a standard size bottle for root beer, which is
also available in brown bottles.

"Alcohol" is available in a

vast variety of bottles of different shapes, sizes and colors
with a variety of different labels, whether it is purchased from
a State Liquor Store or from a local grocery store.

Soda pop,

iced tea and bottled waters are also available in a vast variety
of bottles of different shapes, sizes and colors with a variety
of different labels. Many of these products, alcoholic and nonalcoholic, resemble each other.

Many of the products, alcoholic

and non-alcoholic, are available in brown or dark colored bottles
or are a brown liquid with the appearance of being a dark colored
or brown bottle.

Non-alcoholic beer is available to the general

public and is in brown or dark colored bottles.
Had Officer Arbogast observed a bottle unique to types of
alcohol, such as a "fifth" of alcohol or a quart beer bottle, he
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may have had a basis for reasonable suspicion.

However, his

observance of a "brown bottle" could have been one of many nonalcoholic beverages.
As previously indicated. Officer Arbogast had no other basis
for his stop such as his observation of Appellant's demeanor or
driving pattern to allow the totality of the circumstances to be
analyzed.

The totality of the circumstances in this case is

simply that Officer Arbogast believed his observation of a "brown
colored bottle" was reasonable suspicion for which to stop
Appellant.
The general public consumes these beverages while driving
their vehicles.

There must be some other attendant facts

indicating that the Open Container law is being broken such as
behavior, driving pattern, or at least a specific identification
of the beverage.

If we accept that Officer Arbogast1s hunch was

justified as reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant, we diminish
the standard the law has upheld and expose virtually every
citizen of being invaded and having their constitutional right
violated for drinking a beverage in their vehicle, which may
possibly resemble an alcoholic beverage.

This diminished

standard could also be applied to beverage cans and allow an
officer the right to seize a citizen for consuming a Diet Coke
merely because the can has red, silver and white markings such as
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a Budweiser beer can had the officer suspicioned that it was a
Budweiser can.
Furthermore, it would diminish the standard of reasonable
suspicion for any stop and would theoretically allow citizens to
be seized for smoking a pipe, a hand-rolled cigarette, or even a
cigarette that the officer thought was hand-rolled, with the
justification that the officer suspicioned the pipe or rolled
cigarette contained an illegal chemical substance such as
marijuana.

This analogy can then be applied to many innocent

acts and allow every citizen to be seized because the innocent
act they are engaging in could conceivably be deemed to be
illegal.

This would virtually terminate every citizens

protection against illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment of
the Constitution.

II.
WHETHER APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR AND
IMPARTIAL HEARING BY THE COURT.
At the Suppression Hearing regarding this matter, the
Honorable Alfred C. Van Wagenen, after further redirect
examination, specifically refused Appellant's counsel opportunity
to address the State's examination.

When Appellant's counsel

MUNNS v. STATE OF UTAH
Appellant's Brief

Case No. 970084-CA
-13-

requested the opportunity to address said examination, Judge Van
Wagenen addressed Appellant's counsel as follows:
THE COURT: No, you don't get one more.
You've had enough. You've had enough.
Haven't you really?
Transcript of Suppression Hearing, Record p. 58.
In addition, after lengthy, detailed direct examination and
cross examination of Officer Arbogast at the Suppression Hearing,
the Court asked the following:
THE COURT: Can you describe the wrapper a
little fait that was on the bottle?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT:

It is like a brown paper bag?

It's not.

THE WITNESS: No...
Transcript of Supression Hearing, Record P. 48.
These remarks by the Trial Court and other indications of
inattentiveness are reflective of the fact that Appellant did not
receive a fair and impartial hearing.

It was clear that the

Court was not interested in hearing further testimony in
Appellant's defense and had reached the decision against
Appellant before Appellant had the opportunity to properly
present his defense.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully
requests this Court to reverse the trial court's decision and
remand this case to the trial court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/

day of June, 1997.

KELLY G. CARDON
Attorneys for Appellant
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41-6-44.11

MOTOR VEHICLES

in conformance with prescribed methods, 96
A.L.R.3d 745.
Request before submitting to chemical sobriety test to communicate with counsel as refusal
* \ i * * rvr A T o IA QKO
to take test, 97 A.L.R.3d 852.
Request for prior administration of additional test as constituting refusal to submit to
chemical sobriety test under implied consent
law, 98 A.L.R.3d 572.

Drunk driving: motorist's right to private sobriety test, 45 A.L.R.4th 11.
+ Sufficiency of showing of physical inability
t o ta ke t e s t s f o r
, f i f t d " V } n | ^ l e intoxicated to
f f
f
justify refusal, 68 A.L.R.4th 776.
Challenges to use of breath tests for drunk
drivers based on claim that partition or conversion ratio between measured breath alcohol
and actual blood alcohol is inaccurate, 90
A.L.R.4th 155.

41-6-44.11. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1991, ch. 268, § 49 repeals
§ 41-6-44.11, as enacted by L. 1990, ch. 49,

§ 1, establishing an alcohol and drug testing
fee, effective January 1, 1992.

41-6-44.20. Drinking alcoholic beverage and open containers in motor vehicle prohibited — Definitions
— Exceptions.
(1) A person may not drink any alcoholic beverage while operating a motor
vehicle or while a passenger in a motor vehicle, whether the vehicle is moving, stopped, or parked on any highway.
(2) A person may not keep, carry, possess, transport, or allow another to
keep, carry, possess, or transport in the passenger compartment of a motor
vehicle, when the vehicle is on any highway, any container which contains
any alcoholic beverage if the container has been opened, its seal broken, or the
contents of the container partially consumed.
(3) In this section:
(a) "Alcoholic beverage" has the meaning given in Section 32A-1-105.
(b) "Chartered bus" has the meaning given in Section 32A-1-105.
(c) "Limousine" has the meaning given in Section 32A-1-105.
(d) "Passenger compartment" means the area of the vehicle normally
occupied by the operator and passengers and includes areas accessible to
them while traveling, such as a utility or glove compartment, but does not
include a separate front or rear trunk compartment or other area of the
vehicle not accessible to the operator or passengers while inside the vehicle.
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to passengers in the living quarters
of a motor home or camper.
(5) Subsection (2) does not apply to passengers traveling in any licensed
taxicab or bus.
(6) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to passengers who have carried
their own alcoholic beverage onto a limousine or chartered bus that is in
compliance with Subsections 32A-12-213(l)(b) and (c).
History: C. 1953,41-6-44.20, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 272, § 1; 1987, ch. 92, § 55; 1987,
ch. 138, § 42; 1990, ch. 23, § 188.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective February 21, 1990, substituted
"Section 32A-M05" for "Section 32A-1-5" at

the end of Subsection (3)(a); added present Subsections (3)(b) and (3)(c); redesignated former
Subsection (3)(b) as Subsection (3)(d); and
added Subsection (6).
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

41-6-44.30

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 311.
A.L.R. — Validity of statute or ordinance

making it an offense to consume or have alcoholic beverages in open package in motor vehicle, 57 A.L.R.3d 1071.

41-6-44.30. Seizure and impoundment of vehicles by peace
officers — Impound requirements — Removal of
vehicle by owner.
(1) (a) If a peace officer arrests or cites the operator of a vehicle for violating Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.10, or a local ordinance similar to Section
41-6-44 which complies with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the officer shall seize
and impound the vehicle, except as provided under Subsection (2).
(b) A vehicle seized and impounded under this section shall be moved
by a peace officer or by a tow truck that meets the standards established:
(i) by the department under Subsection 41-6-102(4)(b);
(ii) under Title 41, Chapter 6, Article 18, Tow Truck and Impound
Regulation Act; and
(iii) the Public Service Commission under Section 54-6-42.5.
(2) If a registered owner of the vehicle, other than the operator, is present
at the time of arrest, the officer may release the vehicle to that registered
owner, but only if the registered owner:
(a) requests to remove the vehicle from the scene;
(b) presents to the officer a valid operator's license and sufficient identification to prove ownership of the vehicle;
(c) complies with all restrictions of his operator's license; and
(d) would not, in the judgment of the officer, be in violation of Section
41-6-44 or 41-6-44.10, or a local ordinance similar to Section 41-6-44
which complies with Subsection 41-6-43(1), if permitted to operate the
vehicle, and if the vehicle itself is legally operable.
(3) (a) The peace officer or agency by whom the officer is employed shall,
within 24 hours after the seizure, notify the Motor Vehicle Division of the
seizure and impoundment.
(b) The notice shall state:
(i) the operator's name;
(ii) a description of the vehicle;
(iii) its identification number, if any;
(iv) its license number;
(v) the date, time, and place of impoundment;
(vi) the reason for impoundment; and
(vii) the name of the garage or place where the vehicle is stored.
(4) Upon receipt of notice, the Motor Vehicle Division shall give notice to
the registered owner of the vehicle in the manner prescribed by Section
41-la-114. The notice shall:
(a) state the date, time, and place of impoundment, the name of the
person operating the vehicle at the time of seizure, if applicable, the
reason for seizure and impoundment, and the name of the garage or place
where the vehicle is stored;
(b) state that the registered owner is responsible for payment of towing, impound, and storage fees charged against the vehicle; and
433

77-7-15

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

burden to show reasonable and probable cause
for believing items offered for sale had been
unlawfully taken by the detained or arrested
person; this section in essence codifies the preexisting common law defense of probable cause
to effect an arrest and expands it to incorporate
specific private persons in the shoplifting context. Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 605
R2d 314 (Utah 1979).
Evidence of prior conviction.
Where customer sued merchant for malicious
prosecution, false arrest and false imprisonment arising from alleged shoplifting incident
and introduced evidence the incident left her
severely depressed and suicidal, merchant
which wished to introduce evidence of a prior
shoplifting conviction and its surrounding facts
as affecting the issue of damages was properly
restricted to showing fact of the prior act and
the identity of the party involved in view of,
inter alia, the similarity of the incidents and
substantial likelihood of confusing the jury.
Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d
314 (Utah 1979).
Liability.
—Acquittal.
Store that had probable cause to detain suspected shoplifter's sister was not liable for false
arrest even though sister was subsequently
acquitted of shoplifting charge. Davis v. Zions
Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 29 Utah 2d 336, 509
R2d 362 (1973).
Motive for arrest.
Section offered no civil immunity to a merchant who initiated a customer's arrest for
purpose of effecting a civil remedy to collect
money owed, even if the money was lawfully

owed; thus section did not shield auto dealer
from liability for false imprisonment where
customer drove away in new truck after leaving
check for less than purchase price dealer was
demanding and dealer called police and asked
that truck be picked up, saying there had been
a theft. Greenwell v. Canyon Lincoln Mercury,
Inc., 575 R2d 688 (Utah 1978).
Probable cause.
—Specific cases.
There was sufficient evidence upon which to
base a jury verdict denying damages for false
arrest, where plaintiff, an eighteen-year-old
motorcycle rider, had placed a small article of
merchandise in his helmet, justifying a reasonable suspicion that he was shoplifting. Fuller v.
Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036 (Utah
1975).
—Standard.
The standard applicable to detentions and
arrests by merchants is composed of both subjective and objective elements; the merchant
must allege and prove not only that he believed
in good faith that his conduct was lawful, but
also that his belief was reasonable; even if the
crime was not in fact being committed or attempted, if the merchant in good faith believes
that such facts are present as to lead him to an
honest conclusion that a crime is being committed by the person to be arrested then he may
not be held liable for false arrest. In determining the reasonableness of the conclusion, the
test to be applied is one that is practical under
the circumstances, i.e., whether a reasonable
and prudent man in his position would be
justified in believing facts which would warrant
making the arrest. Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 605 P2d 314 (Utah 1979).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 32 Am. Jur. 2d False Imprisonment §§ 44 et seq., 66.
C.J.S. — 35 C.J.S. False Imprisonment
§§ 14, 21 to 25, 40(4) to (7).
AX.R. — Defamation: actionability of accusation or imputation of shoplifting, 29 A.L.R.3d
961.
Admissibility of defendant's rules or instructions for dealing with shoplifters in action for
false imprisonment or malicious prosecution,
31 A.L.R.3d 705.

77-7-15.

Construction and effect in false imprisonment action of statute providing for detention
of suspected shoplifters, 47 A.L.R.3d 998.
Changing the price tags by patron in selfservice store as criminal offense, 60 A.L.R.3d
1293.
Key Numbers. — False Imprisonment <s=» 2,
10, 13, 15.

Authority of peace officer to stop and question
suspect — Grounds.

A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing
530
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or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address
and an explanation of his actions.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-15, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).

ANALYSIS

Alcohol use by minor.
Avoiding roadblock.
Basis of suspicion.
Court's findings.
Drug use.
No reasonable suspicion.
Out-of-state licenses.
Prostitution.
Revoked license.
Standard.
Suspected shoplifting.
Vehicles.
Cited.

Court's findings.
Trial court erred in ruling that a city police
officer had a reasonable suspicion to justify
seizing defendant, who was seen emerging from
a 24-hour grocery store at 3:30 a.m., where the
court made only a conclusory finding that defendant's answers to questions regarding the
ownership of a vehicle in the store parking lot
were "inconsistent, vague and suspicious.*
State v. Munsen, 821 R2d 13 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).

Alcohol use by minor.
Defendant's young appearance and the smell
of alcohol on defendant's breath gave police
officer a reasonable articulable suspicion, based
on objective evidence, that the defendant had
consumed alcohol and was a minor. State v.
Bean, 869 P.2d 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Avoiding roadblock.
Avoiding a roadblock, even assuming its legality, without more, does not create an
articulable suspicion that the occupants have
engaged in or are about to engage in criminal
activity. The act merely demonstrates a desire
to avoid police confrontation, and at best only
gives rise to a hunch that criminal activity may
be afoot. State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
Basis of suspicion.
The reasonable, articulable suspicion contemplated in this section must be based on
objective facts suggesting that the individual
may be involved in criminal activity. State v.
Menke, 787 P.2d 537 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
In order to conclude that there was reasonable suspicion to justify stopping defendant, an
officer must be able to articulate some unlawful
or suspicious behavior connecting the detainee
to the suspected criminal activity. State v. Potter, 863 P.2d 40 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
When a reliable source with reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts reports the
commission of a crime and, based on the relayed facts, the dispatcher communicates the
information to the police, and the responding
officer's own observations corroborate the dispatch, reasonable suspicion exists for a stop.

Drug use.
When an officer saw defendant smoking a
cigarette, which from her training and experience she recognized as a marijuana ^oint,"
while the defendant was in a vacant parking lot
in his vehicle with the windows rolled up on a
warm day, even though the defendant's activity
was conceivably consistent with innocent activity, it was strongly indicative of criminal activity and the officer had reasonable grounds to
stop the vehicle and investigate further. Provo
City Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993).
No reasonable suspicion.
Where suspects were detained on the basis of
a description by a fellow officer who had seen
them walking in the vicinity of a burglary, and
where the suspects were not observed at the
scene of the crime, or engaging in unlawful or
suspicious activity, the "reasonable suspicion"
test was not met. State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d
718 (Utah 1985).
Detention of defendant on a city street at
3:30 a.m. was unreasonable where the initial
decision to stop was based merely on the lateness of the hour and the high-crime factor in
the area, and defendant's "nervous" conduct
was consistent with innocent as well as with
criminal behavior. State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Seizure of defendant's automobile was invalid, where his initial stop for driving in the
left lane had been used as a pretext to support
the arresting officer's "hunch" that defendant
was engaged in illegal activity. State v. Sierra,
754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
No reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
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The defendant's brief visit to a house under
surveillance because of a suspicion of drug
trafficking was not a sufficient basis for an
officer to stop the defendant's vehicle after her
departure from the house. The facts were not
sufficient to give the officer an articulable suspicion that the defendant had engaged in criminal activity. State v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992).
Out-of-state licenses.
An officer had no reasonable suspicion to
make an investigatory stop based merely on the
fact that a car with out-of-state license plates
was moving slowly through a neighborhood late
at night. State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah
1986).
Prostitution.
Police officers who observed a woman standing on a sidewalk talking to the male occupant
of a pickup truck, and who believed that a
prostitution deal had been made, were authorized to investigate more fully by interviewing
the occupants of the vehicle. State v. Holmes,
774 P.2d 506 (Ct. App. 1989).
Revoked license.
Police officers had reasonable suspicion to
make an investigatory stop of defendant's vehicle, where they knew that defendants driver's license had been revoked and that his
passenger was sought on an arrest warrant.

State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987).
Standard.
In traffic violation stops, in balancing the
rights of individuals to be free from arbitrary
interference by law enforcement officers and
the government's interest in crime prevention
and public protection, if a hypothetical reasonable police officer would not have stopped the
driver for the cited traffic offense, and the
surrounding circumstances indicate the stop is
a pretext, the stop is unconstitutional. State v.
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Suspected shoplifting.
Defendant's pre-arrest seizure was valid,
where he was seen by police officers near a
shopping mall entrance removing a box from
beneath his shirt, and his actions in transferring the box's contents into a bag strongly
suggested shoplifting. State v. Menke, 787 P.2d
537 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Vehicles.
Evidence sufficient to conclude that the occupants of a vehicle may have been engaged in
criminal activity. State v. Baumgaertel, 762
P.2d 2 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Cited in Bountiful City v. Maestas, 788 P.2d
1062 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Davis, 821
P.2d 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Leonard,
825 P.2d 664 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Police Dog: Possibilities for Abuse in Finding Probable Cause

for Arrest, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 408.
C.J.S. — 6A C.J.S. Arrest §§ 38 to 42.

77-7-16. Authority of peace officer to frisk suspect for
dangerous weapon — Grounds.
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for questioning may
frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any
other person is in danger.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-16, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
(1968). State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291 (Utah
1986).

ANALYSIS

Interpretation of section.
Reasonable belief test.
Interpretation of section.
This section must be interpreted to meet the
constitutional requirements of Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889

Reasonable belief test.
In assessing the reasonableness of the officer's actions, it is not essential that the officer
actually be in fear, nor need he be absolutely
certain that the individual is armed. The issue
is whether a reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief
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History: C. 1953, 77-7-6, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1995, ch. 118, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, redesignated Sub-
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sections (1), (2), and (3) as (l)(a), (1Kb), and
(l)(c), added new Subsection (2), and made a
minor punctuation change,

77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question
suspect — Grounds.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Basis of suspicion.
No reasonable suspicion.
Standard.
Vehicles
- Possible hidden compartment.
Basis of suspicion.
This section contemplates that an officer may
complete a non-consensual investigative stop
and stay within the boundaries drawn by the
constitution if the officer is able to point to
objective, specific, and articulable facts that
warrant the intrusion upon the person. State v.
Contrel, 886 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. App. 1994),
cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995).
No reasonable suspicion.
In the absence of any evidence concerning the
factual basis for the radioed instruction on
which the investigating officer acted, the state
failed to meet its burden of establishing facts
supporting the reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to stop defendant's vehicle.

State v. Case, 884 R2d 1274 (Utah Ct. App.
Standard.
While the required level of reasonable suspi*
lower than the standard required for
probable cause to arrest, the same totality of
facts and circumstances approach is used to
determine if there are sufficient "specific and
articulable facts" to support reasonable suspicion. State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah
1995).
Vehicles.

c on ls

- Possible hidden compartment.
Objective facts upon which officers suspicions were based, including an apparent substantial structural modification of defendant's
pickup truck in order to conceal a hidden cornpartment, supported a reasonable suspicion
that defendant was involved in criminal activity. State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah
1995).

77-7-19. Appearance required by citation — Arrest for
failure to appear — Transfer of cases — Motor
vehicle violations — Disposition of fines and
costs.
(1) Persons receiving misdemeanor citations shall appear before the magistrate designated in the citation on or before the time and date specified in the
citation unless the uniform bail schedule adopted by the Judicial Council or
Subsection 77-7-21(1) permits forfeiture of bail for the offense charged.
(2) A citation may not require a person to appear sooner than five days or
later than 14 days following its issuance.
(3) A person who receives a citation and who fails to comply with Section
77-7-21 on or before the time and date and at the court specified is subject to
arrest. The magistrate may issue a warrant of arrest.
(4) Except where otherwise provided by law, a citation or information issued
for violations of Title 41 shall state that the person receiving the citation or
information shall appear before the magistrate who has jurisdiction over the
offense charged.
(5) Any justice court judge may, upon the motion of either the defense
attorney or prosecuting attorney, based on a lack of territorial jurisdiction or
the disqualification of the judge, transfer cases to a justice court with
territorial jurisdiction or the district court within the county.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
John Bradley NICHOIAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 96-4022.
(D.C.N0.94-CR-3)
United States Court of
Appeals, Tenth Circuit,
Dec. 20, 1996.
Before PORFILIQ, HOLLOWAY,
and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT [FNl]
?N1. This order and

judgment: is not binding
precedent, except under
the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel.
This court generally
disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments;
nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited
under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir.
R. 36.3.
**1 Defendant appeals the
district court's decision
denying nis motion to suppress
evidence seized during the
course of a traffic stop.
Following the court's ruling,
defendant entered a
conditional guilty plea to
possession of a controlled
substance with intent to
distribute in violation of 21
U.S-C. § 841(a)(1) and receipt
of a firearm by a restricted
person in violation of IS
U.S.C. § 922 (n). On appeal,
defendant argues the police
officers' conduct violated the
Fourth Amendment because it
was not justified at its
inception and was not
reasonably related in scope to
the surrounding circumstances.
We believe the record fails to
support the district courtTs
finding the defendant's
initial stop was reasonable
and reverse.

At 5:5C am en December 19,
1993, Officer Lance London,
patrollinc in the city of
South Ogden, Utah, noticed a
car parked in the lot of an
all-night bowling alley. He
observed a passenger exit from
the car and wave his arms in
the air. As Officer London
pulled into the parking lot,
the passenger put something on
the ground, leaned in-co the
car to speak to the driver,
then shut the car door and
walked into the bowling alley.
Officer London circled the
parked car and noted the
object on the ground was a
beer can, but did not see
whether the can was open or
closed. [FN2] London also
noted that the driver,
defendant John Bradley
Nicholas, sat still and kept
his head forward until the
officer had driven past. As
the officer parked and got out
of his car, Mr. Nicholas drove
out of the let, making a
proper stop at the exit and a
lawful right turn onto the
street. Officer London
followed and pulled Mr.
Nicholas ever to the curb a
short distance from the lot.
Officer London described the
stop in this testimony:
FN2. An officer retrieved
the can after Nicholas's
arresr; the can was
closed.
Q. Okay. Officer London, what
did you stop the vehicle for?
A, I thought: it likely that
the driver roay have been
drinking.

Q. And what factors did you
observe that led you to
believe that?
A . Weil, i saw what I
believed was someone getting
out of the car with what I
thought to be an open
container.
Q. Arid was there anything
about the behavior of either
of the persons that gave ycu
any suspicion?
A. Well, I noticed the
passenger acting strangely but
the driver just—I thought it
suspicious the way rhe driver
didn't look at me j u s t —
0- If he had looked at you
would that make you
suspicious?
A. Well, not necessarily. It
just—the driver se&r&a
nervous about me being there.
Q. Whan was in your mind?
What was the reason you pulled
the vehicle over?
A. I thought the driver may
have been drinking, (emphasis
added).
As Officer London approached,
Mr. Nicholas opened the
driver's side door and asked
rhe officer why he had oeen
stopped. The officer replied
he had seen a passenger exit
the car with a beer and
wondered if Mr. Nicholas had
been drinking. If there was a
reply to the question, the
officer later testified he
could not recall it. [FN3]

FN3. Utah law permits
drivers to have closed
containers of beer in
their cars. It is legal
to drink from open
containers of alcohol in
parking lots but not on
roadways- Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-44.20 provides:
(1) a person nay not
drink any alcoholic
beverage while operating
a motor vehicle or while
a passenger in a motor
vehicle, whether the
venicle is moving,
stopped, or parked on any
highway; (2) a person
may not keep, carry,
possess, transport, or
allow another tc keep/
carry, possess/ or
transport in the
passenger compartment of
a motor vehicle, when the
vehicle is on any
highway, any container
which contains any
alcoholic beverage if the
container has been
opened, its seai broken,
or the contents of the
container partially
consumed.

Utah law does not
specifically forbid a
person from driving after
having consumed alcoholic
beverages. Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-44(2)
provides:
(a) A person may not
operate or be in actual
physical control of a
vehicle within this state
if the person: (i) has a
blood or breath alcohol
concentration cf .08
grams or greater , .. or
(ii) is under the

influence of alcohol, any
drug, or tne combined
influence of alcohol and
any drug to a degree that
renaers the person
incapable of safely
operating a vehicle.
Thereafter, events took place
that are unnecessary to
reiterate here save tc note
searches of the vehicle
occurred leading to the
production of evidence
supporting the charges filed
against the defendant, we
need not detail either the
events or the products of the
searches because the stop is
key to what followed. Indeed/
because of the testimony of
Officer London, the entire
case revolves about the
validity of the initial stop.
**2 A traffic stop
constitutes a seizure within
the meaning of the Fcurth
Amendment; for purposes of
constitutional analysis, it is
characterized as an
investigative detention rather
than a custodial arrest.
United States v. Botero-

Qspinar 71 F.3d 753/ 786 »10th
Cir.1995), cert, denied, 116
S.Ct. 2529 (1996). An
investigative detention must
be based upon " 'specific and
articulable facts which, taker,
together with reasonable
inferences from those facts,
seasonably warrant that
intrusion.' " United States
v. Leef 73 F.3d 1034, 1038
(10th Cir.1996) (quoting Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968)). Reasonable suspicion
is determined by the totality

o£ the circumstances, id.;
United States v* Barbee, 966
F,2d 1026, 1028 (ICth
Cir,1992); but to justify the
stop, the detaining officer
must have a reasonable
articulable suspicion that the
detainee has been, is, or is
about to be engaged in
criminal activity* Dnited
States v. Nicholson, 983 F-2d
983r 987 (10th Cir.1993). An
officer's unparticularized
suspicion or hunch cannot
create circumstances giving
rise to reasonable suspicionUnited States v. Fernandez, 18
F.3d 874, 878 (10th Cir.1994),
We review findings of fact
related to a motion to
suppress in a light most
favorable to the government
and set aside those findings
only when clearly erroneous•
United States v. Davis, 94
F.3d 1465, 1467 (ICth
Cir.1996). "We review de novo,
however, the district court's
conclusion an officer has a
reasonable, articulable
suspicion of criminal activity
at the time of the seizure.
Id. This review is in two
steps• First, we determine
whether the officer's action
was justified at its
inception; then, whether the
action was reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances
which justified the
interference in the first
place.
Lee, 73 F.3d at 1038;
Bctero-Ospina, 71 F,3d at 786.
A traffic stop is justified at
its inception if "this
particular officer has
reasonable suspicion that this
particular motorist violated
'any one of the multitude of

applicable traffic and
equipment regulations' of the
jurisdiction.w Botero-Ospina
at 71 F.3d at 787 (citations
omitted)•

The district court's
conclusion Officer London had
reasonable suspicion was based
upon five factors: (1) the
incident occurred early in the
morning; (2) the passenger
made strange gestures when he
exited the car; (3) the
passenger placed a beer can on
the ground; (4) the defendant
did not make eye contact with
Officer London, and; (5) the
defendant drove out of the
parking lot as the officer
parked and started to get out
of his car. While
reasonableness of the
officer's conduct is assessed
using a totality of the
circumstances test,
examination of each factor is
useful because "[s]ome facts
must be outrightly dismissed
as 30 innocent or susceptible
to varying interpretations as
to be innocuous," Lee, 73
F.3d at 1039.
The time of the incident has
little relevance in this
analysis, Mr, Nicholas's car
was parked in the lot of an
establishment that was open
for twenty-four hours each
day. It is reasonably
inferable the business
maintained those hours because
enough customers frequented it
late at night and early in the
morning to make its hours of
operation appropriate. Had
defendant's car been spotted
in the lot of an abandoned
building, or at least a closed

business/ the district court's
consideration of the time of
day to shroud the incident in
suspicion would have been more
logical. Second, the
connection between the early
hour and the likelihood of Mr.
Nicholas's intoxication is
counter-intuitive• The time
of day might be important if
Officer London suspected Mr.
Nicholas of falling asleep at
the wheel, or even of engaging
in general malfeasance, but
the government offers the
early morning hour as evidence
to support London's particular
suspicion that Nicholas had
been drinking. Because the
government presented no
testimony to explain the basis
for this inference, we fail tc
understand why it is more
likely that Mr. Nicholas would
have b^Bti drinking beer at
5:30 am than at another time
of day.
**3 Of equal concern is the
evidentiary value of the
passenger's odd gestures and
possession of a beer. Albeit
those facts might have
provided Officer London with
reasonable suspicion that the
passenger had been drinking,
but he did not explain, nor
can we see, how those acts or
any of the passenger's other
acts form a constitutionallysound basis for believing
defendant had been drinking.
Indeed, courts have long
recognized that an
individual's mere proximity to
questionable or illegal
conduct does not imply
involvement in that conduct,
and may not be used to justify

police intrusion. See Sibron
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 6263 (1968) (defendant's
interaction with known drug
addicts over period of eight
hours did not create probable
cause for officer's subsequent
search and seizure!; Ybarra
v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91
(1979) ("a person's mere
propinquity to others
independently suspected of
criminal activity does not,
without more, give rise to
probable cause . •. [w]here tne
standard is probable cause, a
search or seizure cf a person
must be supported by probable
cause particularized with
respect to that person");
Brown v. Texas, 4 43 U.S. 47,
52 (defendant's presence in
neighborhood frequented by
drug users and officer's
contention that situation
"looked suspicious" did not
support finding of reasonable
suspicion to stop defendant;
specific, objective facts must
indicate that particular
individual involved in illegal
activity).
The government interprets
Nicholas's failure to make eye
contact with the officer as
nervous behavior, presumably
suggesting a guilty
conscience. This argument is
supported neither by logic nor
by case law. Involuntary
contact with a police officer
will often elicit some feeling
of anxiety in a law- abiding
citizen. Here, Officer London
slowly circled Mr. Nicholasfs
parked car and then stopped
directly behind hin without
indicating any purpose or
reason for his interest. We

believe it quite^appropriate
that Mr, Nicholas would feel
some wariness or {apprehension
in that situation.
Moreover,, we na-|e
acknowledged tha$ nervousness
seldom serves asja reliable
factor in determining whether
an officer's conduct was
justified, in Fernandez, we
reminded:
j
We have repeatedly held that
nervousness is of limited
significance in]determining
reasonable suspicion and
that the government's
repetitive reliance on the
nervousness of either the
driver or passenger as a
basis for reasonable
suspicion in all cases of
this kind must jpe treated
with caution, :i
Id. at 879 (citation
omitted)• Furthermore, in
Barbee, we specifically
discounted avoidance of eye
contact as suspicious
behavior: n[S]uah behavior
[passengers .sinking down below
seat level] is suspicious
conduct not cleanly
susceptible to unsuspicious
interpretations, junlike
passengers merely avoiding eye
contact....* Id] at 1029.
Interestingly, dfficer
London's testimony reveals the
unreliability ofjthis factor*
Although he stated that Mr.
Nicholas's lack qf eye contact
raised his suspicion, he
almost immediately
contradicted himself by
conceding that hid Mr.
Nicholas looked at him
instead, Officer {London might
have found that auspicious as

well. [FN4]
FK4. The Ninth Circuit
has remarked that the
phenomenon of allowing
both eye contact and
avoidance of eye contact
to qualify as suspicious
behavior wput[s] the
officers in a classic
'heads I win, tails you
lose1 position." United
States v. Garcia-Camacho,
53 F.3d 244, 247 (9th
Cir-1995).
**4 The government argued,
and the district court
accepted, that Mr, Nicholas's
departure from the parking lot
after the officer pulled up
behind him constituted
suspicious behavior,
suggesting that act was viewed
as an attempt to evade the
officer. Yet, defendant's
actions were not consistent
with that theory. Mr,
Nicholas left the parking lot
just after his passenger
exited from the car and
entered the bowling alley.
Officer London did not turn en
his emergency lights, call
out, or indicate in any other
way that he expected Mr.
Nicholas to remain in the
parking lot. Nicholas did not
speed out of the lot, and he
pulled to the side of the road
as soon as London signaled him
to stop, indeed, Officer
London did not testify that
defendant's departure from the
parking lot was unwarranted in
any way.
This court already has
refused to characterize as

suspicious than that of Mr.
Nicholas, The driver in
Fernandez, for example, pulled
into the emergency lane after
noticing a police officer
following him- After a
quarter mile, the officer
pulled into the :.ane behind
him but did not activate his
lights. The driver reentered
traffic, and the officer
switched lanes again and
stopped the car. We rejected
the government's argument that
the driver's condact
constituted evasion,
emphasizing that the driver
pulled over prorrptiy when
signaled by the officer.
Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 878-79.

factors relied upon by the
government and the district
court. First, Officer London
had no prior contact with Mr.
Nicholas and had no basis to
evaluate his demeanor or the
likelihood that he would be
drinking at a rather unusual
time of day. See United
States v. Bloom, 975 F,2d
1447, 145$ {10th Cir.1992)
("we do not understand how
Agent Ochoa would know whether
defendant was acting nervous
and excited or whether he was
merely acting in his normal
manner"), overruled on other
grounds United States v.
Little, 18 F.3d 1499 (10th
Cir.1994).

In reliance upon Terry, the
government argues while each
factor independently
constitutes entirely innocent
behavior, all the factors
taken together transform the
situation into veritable
opprobrium. But this is not a
case liice Terry, where the
defendants' actions could only
be understood when examined as
a series of interconnected
events-. Instead, Nicholas's
conduct was appropriate at
each separate step as well as
within the content of the
overall situation. While
acknowledging a totality of
the circumstances test governs
this analysis, we cannot
discount completely the fact
that none of the individual
factors supports a specific,
particularized suspicion Mr.
Nicholas was committing a
ciime.

Second, Officer London had
not received a tip or
information from another law
enforcement officer that Mr.
Nicholas might be engaging in
illegal activity. See Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146
(1972) (reasonable suspicion
to stop and frisk defendant
supported by receipt of tip);
Nicholson, 983 F.26 at 987
(reasonable suspicion
supported by information and
description received from
other police officers).

Several additional

**5 Third, Officer London
testified he stopped Mr.
Nicholas because he believed
he might have been drinking.
Consumption of alcohol by
persons over the age of
twentyone is not a crime;
therefore, Officer London,
must have meant he stopped Mr*
Nicholas because he suspected
He was driving under the

influence of alcohol.
However, Officer London was
unable to recall Mr,
Nicholas's response to his
specific question., whether ne
had in fact been drinking, and
did not provide any evidence
other than hia hunch that such
was the case. He did net, for
example, attempt to
substantiate that hunch by
performance of field sobriety
tests. See Fernandez/ 18 F.2C
at 881 (finding detention
exceeded proper scope and
noting officer "administered
no roadside sobriety tests;
did not request the defendant
submit to biood, breath, or
urine tests; and issued no
citation for driving while
impaired").
Furthermore, Officer London
described no driving pattern
chat might support an
inference thai: Mr. Nicholas
was criving under the
influence of alconol. Yet, we
have consistently relied uoon
evidence of improper operation
of a vehicle to uphold the
validity of a traffic stop.
See Lee, 73 F.3d at 1038
(straddling lane and lane
change supported reasonable
suspicion that driver was
sleepy or intoxicated;
initial stop valid); BetereOspina, 71 F.3d at 738
(traveling under speed limit
and straddling lane supported
reasonable suspicion driver
impaired); King, 990 F.2d at
1561 (incessant honking at
scene of accident provided
justification tc detain driver
tc inform and advise cf
conditions; initial stop
valid). But see Barbee, 966

F.2d at 1029 {listing six
factors, but none a moving
violation, to support federal
agent's reasonable suspicion
illegal immigrants were riding
in vehicle).
The evidence in this case
simply does not support a
determination that at the time
of the initial stop Officer
London had reasonable,
particularized suspicion Mr.
Nicholas had coan&itted or was
committing a crime. The
traffic stop, therefore,
violated defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights. Davis, 94
F.3d at 14 68-^0, Although the
events occurring after the
stop demonstrated Mr. Nicholas
was in apparent violation cf
the law, we must constantly
remind ourselves a seizure is
not made valid by what a
subsequent search produces.
The judgment of the district
court is REVERSED, and the
cause is REMANDED with
instructions to vacate the

conditional plea*
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